1986. It was a beautiful summer afternoon at the Rouyn-Noranda airport (CYUY). The Transport Canada flight service station employees knew that a cold front was approaching and would soon sweep the airport. Until then, it was still a perfect day. Blue sky, light winds. At the time, the flight service specialists (FSS) did not have access to radar images or satellite pictures.
To get an idea of what was coming from the west, we were normally using an Environment Canada aviation weather forecast and the actual weather observations of two flight service stations in Ontario, Earlton FSS and Timmins FSS. Their last weather observation mentioned a wind shift and an isolated thunderstorm. But Timmins was far away and could only provide us with a rough estimate of the situation.
As I was working the evening shift on that day, I checked the wind speed indicator, as a reflex developed throughout the years. What I saw was kind of unreal. The speed indicator’s needle suddenly went from showing few knots to 20 knots, and then 40 knots, hesitated a little then went up to 60 knots and, in a final correction, reached 72 knots, which was about 134 km/h.
Everything was so peaceful around the flight service station. I looked through the window to detect any moving object. At that very moment, the wooden shed normally used by the fuel man passed in front of the station. That wooden structure must certainly have weighted few hundred kilos. The fact that it was moving at a good speed was a clear indication that the instruments were working properly. A squall line was associated with the cold front progression.
Everything that was not properly fixed to the ground started moving. In the next hour, strong thunderstorms going eastward moved in over Rouyn-Noranda. The Val-d’Or airport (CYVO) being located sixty miles east, it was clear that it would be hit directly in about two hours. I called the Val-d’Or control tower so that everyone got prepared for the squall line. That gave them enough time to tie everything correctly and damages were limited.
One hour later, everything was back to normal in Rouyn-Noranda and we profited from an ideal summer night.
For more real life stories on the Rouyn-Noranda flight service station and flight service specialists, click here:
A Man, a Time and the Deadliest Hurricane in History
Isaac’s Storm
The book recounts the events surrounding a disaster caused by a major hurricane having taken place in the United States in 1900. The author ensures that the scientific notions connected with meteorology are explained in a simple manner, knowing very well that a big part of his readership has only elementary knowledge on the subject.
I appreciated the way the events were told, since Erik Larson’s book is not limited only to human or material disaster which ensued from the passage of the hurricane on Galveston and the surrounding cities. The reader can learn about the development of Meteorological Offices in the United States, the equipment used at that time as much as the help brought by ship captains with regards to weather observations. It is also interesting to read about all the political and commercial pressures felt by some staff of the US Weather Bureau.
The Galveston disaster was not due to the malfunction of the meteorological instruments nor their limitation. It was rather caused by the disproportionate egos of the forecaster Isaac Cline and some of his managers, as well as pressures of all kinds on Isaac as an observer and forecaster.
Isaac Cline: a disproportionate ego
Isaac had acquired an excellent reputation throughout the years. Little by little, his scientific approach gave way to a certainty of always being right and the desire to be perceived as the leading expert in the field of meteorology. In one of his papers, he refutes openly one hundred years of accumulated knowledge in meteorology.
The Galveston population had asked for a breakwater to be built in order to limit the potential damages caused by a major hurricane. But Isaac wrote an article in which he explained why Galveston was not susceptible to suffer the effects of a major hurricane. The breakwater not being seen any more as a pressing project, the idea of its construction was abandoned.
An ego bigger than nature from some administrators of the US WEATHER BUREAU
On the island of Cuba, in 1900, there were American observers working for the US WEATHER BUREAU and Cuban observers monitoring the weather for their own country. The Cubans, as natural residents of the island, had gradually acquired a huge experience in the prediction of the passage and the trajectory of major meteorological systems. Powerful countries having a natural tendency to underestimate the capacities and experience of inhabitants of smallest nations, warnings coming from the Cubans were regularly brushed aside.
If the US WEATHER BUREAU had been attuned to the Cuban weather observer comments in 1900, the terrible hurricane which destroyed Galveston would have had much less tragic consequences. But, in the “Isaac storm” book, we learn that the communication links were voluntarily cut between both countries by the US WEATHER BUREAU. The Cuban forecasters were considered like poor inhabitants capable of announcing a storm only when it had practically left the island.
“The same day that the Weather Bureau published in the newspaper of Havana that the last hurricane had reached the Atlantic, the Belen Observatory (Cuba) said in the same papers that the center had crossed the eastern portion of the island and that it would undoubtedly reach Texas. A few hours later the first telegraphic announcement of the ravages of the cyclone in Galveston was received”. Six days after the Galveston disaster, the War Department revoked the ban on Cuban weather cables and the communication of information was re-established.
Of pressures exercised by the Galveston businessmen on the forecaster and weather observer Isaac Cline
A first type of pressure on the observer was of commercial order: there was a competition between Houston and Galveston to determine which of both cities would become the major commercial center in the South of Texas. Galveston was however more vulnerable to hurricanes, because it is an island while Houston is farther away inland. Isaac Cline, the observer and forecaster based in Galveston, minimized the chances that his city could suffer the devastating effects of a major hurricane. It was out of question to depreciate Galveston in the eyes of potential investors.
Of strong pressures exercised by administrators of the US WEATHER BUREAU on the forecaster and weather observer
Another type of pressure on the observer resulted directly from Isaac’s managers, in the US WEATHER BUREAU. At the time, weather forecasts were only at an elementary stage and the US WEATHER BUREAU wanted to avoid alarming the population by using words like “hurricane”. They did not want to be the laughing stock of the population if the famous hurricane announced ended up to be only a standard storm. Isaac knew that his role consisted in delaying as much as possible the use of the word “hurricane”. Not wanting to go against the orders and to preserve his reputation with the Bureau, he possibly convinced himself that there was no major meteorological system approaching Galveston. He even told the population to stay put.
Galveston has always suffered and still does from an unfavorable geographical position. The hot waters in the Gulf of Mexico have always been an essential ingredient in the recipe of a major hurricane. This is where a storm will draw much of its energy. But, in the 1900 disaster, Galveston was also a victim of the combination of disproportionate egos, lack of judgment and commercial and political pressures exercised on the forecaster and the observer. All in all, approximately 10,000 people died in Galveston while thousands of others suffered the same fate in the surrounding cities.
If the population had been informed correctly, damage to property would nevertheless have been extremely important, but the losses of life would have been negligible.
